INTRODUCTION
States increasingly are raising financing indirectly through special-purpose entities (SPEs), variously referred to as authorities, special authorities, or public authorities.
1 Some states, such as New York, New Jersey, and Virginia, issue relatively few general obligation bonds, 2 [A] state such as New York, for example, with one of the highest percapita debt burdens in the nation, owes only $3.5 billion in "general obligation" debt. New York owes the remainder of its $78.4 billion in debt through hundreds of special "authorities," including the Transitional Finance Authority, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Dormitory Authority, and others.
obtaining most of their financing through bonds issued by state SPEs: 3 Virtually all states obtain at least a portion of their public financing through state SPEs.
Notwithstanding their long history and increasingly widespread use, relatively little is known about state SPEs. 5 Originally modeled on the Port Authority of London, 6 state SPEs were first used in the United States in the late nineteenth century. 7 They initially were seen as a way to bypass various restrictions that hampered traditional government agencies, notably constitutional debt limits and jurisdictional limitations. 8 In recent years, however, the use of state SPEs increasingly has been paralleling the use of special-purpose entities in corporate finance (hereinafter, corporate SPEs) as a means of raising "off-balance-sheet" financing. This is a financing in which 6 . Nehemkis, supra note 5, at 14 n.2. 7. Shestack, supra note 5, at 556. 8. See Fox & Fox, supra note 5, at 178 (explaining that it was much easier to create an SPE than to remove a constitutional debt limit, and noting that SPEs were in part created to solve jurisdictional issues that arose because "political boundaries . . . never coincide with social and economic boundaries"); see also GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (GASB), STATEMENT NO. 14: THE FINANCIAL REPORTING ENTITY ¶ ¶ 5-7 (1991) (noting that separate organizations are sometimes created to overcome state constitutional, statutory, or charter obstacles or to provide a level of autonomy not permitted by the "general government's organizational framework"). These paragraphs are not impacted by GASB the repayment obligation of the SPE is not required to be disclosed as a liability on the balance sheet of the SPE's creator. 10 This trend in the use of state SPEs is troubling. By reducing financial transparency, off-balance-sheet financing undermines financial integrity and creates a potential for abuseillustrated in the corporate context, for example, by Enron's use of SPEs for balance-sheet manipulation.
11 Off-balance-sheet financing can even trigger systemic consequences. 12 Its use by corporate SPEs is seen, for example, as a contributing cause of the 2008 financial crisis. 13 The lack of transparency can also have other serious consequences, such as preventing state general obligation bonds from being priced correctly based on state fiscal risk. 14. To the extent investors in state general obligation bonds are unaware of de facto guaranteed state SPE debt (and of the fiscal impact of those de facto guarantees on the state), those bonds would almost certainly be mispriced.
15. See Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra note 9, at 1314 (beginning an inquiry into differentiating legitimate and illegitimate uses of corporate SPEs). In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the problem was not the use of corporate SPEs, per se. Rather, non-traditional asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligation (ABS CDO) securitization transactions, which relied on corporate SPEs, were structured in a way that abused in public finance than in corporate finance. Several factors contribute to this aggravated potential. Reduced transparency of state SPEs, like corporate SPEs, can undermine financial integrity. Unlike corporate SPEs, however, reduced transparency of state SPEs can also undermine constitutional and democratic legitimacy. 16 Moreover, state SPEs are more likely to be misused than corporate SPEs because public finance is more susceptible than corporate finance to monitoring failures. 17 even relatively small errors in cash flow projections could cause defaults and downgradings. When these errors occurred, the resulting defaults and downgradings panicked investors, who started avoiding the debt markets, in turn causing the price of debt securities to fall, which in turn (because of mark-to-market accounting) caused market prices to plummet further downward in a death spiral. The lack of debt financing meant that companies could no longer grow-and in some cases, even survive-affecting the real economy and, at least in part, contributing to the financial crisis. and possibly to circumvent tax and expenditure limitations"); Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 871, 900 (noting the "ability of public authorities to evade many of the good governance checks applicable to public agencies such as oversight and accountability" and proposing a unified regional overseer and setter of policy for public services provided by state SPEs).
17. Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 898-99 (noting that state SPEs lack key regulatory features present in corporate SPEs-such as shareholders and market forces-resulting in diminished oversight and increased potential for abuse and corruption). This Article does not engage the question of federal government use of SPEs, which is much more limited than state government use of SPEs. For example, in order to stabilize and bring liquidity back to the commercial paper markets during the 2008 financial crisis, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) created, among other facilities, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to operate as a lender of last resort for those markets. Because the Fed traditionally used its lender-of-lastresort powers under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to only make loans to banks, it structured the CPFF as a series of Fed loans to State Street Bank and Trust Company, which then made back-to-back loans to a newlycreated special-purpose entity, CPFF LLC. CPFF LLC used the back-to-back loan proceeds to purchase commercial paper from corporations and other commercial paper issuers. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY AND TAX AVOIDANCE
Although state SPEs are sometimes used to avoid constitutional debt limits in state constitutions, at least some of these limits would not support the increased functions of modern state government and hence are "obsolete."
38 Without the ability to get around these limits, many states "would barely be able to function." 39 Although a more democratic way of addressing the limits would be to amend state constitutions to increase or remove them, 40 Similarly, the use of state conduit SPEs to take advantage of the federal municipal bond tax exemption is relatively straightforward, at least from the standpoint of state public finance. The interesting question is why this federal tax exemption, unlike most other U.S. Internal Revenue Code exemptions, the longstanding use of state SPEs to bypass obsolete debt limits is not this Article's central concern. 41 B. REDUCING TRANSPARENCY AND AVOIDING PUBLIC SCRUTINY respects form over substance. Answering that question, however, would primarily be a federal tax law inquiry and thus is beyond this Article's scope.
The most troubling use of state SPEs is their increasing use to reduce financial transparency and enable government officials to avoid public scrutiny. Consider transparency. Rating agencies and the public rely heavily on state financial statements. 42 The balance sheet-also called, in public finance, a statement of net assets-is central because it shows the state's assets and liabilities. State SPE debt is often not shown, however, as balancesheet indebtedness of a state. 44 On a purely technical level, this makes sense: state SPEs are legally separate units of states, and states rarely guarantee the debt of their units. 45 Most state SPE debt is moral obligation debt, appropriation-contingent debt, revenue debt, or non-recourse debt.
States therefore are not usually legally obligated to pay that debt. The story, however, is more complicated. 46 reserve fund equal to maximum annual debt service; if the reserve must be drawn down, certification shall be made to the governor (or another appropriate official) who must include a request for the deficiency in the budget. The legislature is under no legal obligation to fund the request, hence the moral appellation.
Moral obligation debt means that the state SPE debt is supported by a 47 Appropriation-contingent debt (also called appropriation debt) is different than moral obligation debt insofar as it contemplates the appropriation as the primary source of payment. 48 It is not technically a legal obligation of the state because the legislature has no legal obligation to fund the appropriation.
49
Revenue debt is repayable solely from the profits of a state enterprise SPE, and thus legally is not state debt. 50 And because non-recourse debt is not a legal obligation of the state conduit SPE that issues it, it is not a legal obligation of the state. 51 State SPE debt that a state is not legally obligated to pay is not ordinarily shown as debt on the state's balance-sheet. Occasionally, state SPE debt is shown in a separate column as indebtedness of the state's "component units." However, the relevant state accounting principles, promulgated by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), require this disclosure only for debt of state SPEs that are both (i) "fiscally dependent" on the state-meaning that the state "either has authority over the [state SPE's] budget, the setting of its taxes and charges, or its issuance of debt" 53 -and also (ii) in a non-temporary "financial benefit or burden relationship" with the state. 54 Thus, if a state is "only required to approve the issuance of revenue bonds for a water district but the water district does not receive a [non-temporary] subsidy" from the state, the water district "would not be considered a component unit" of the state. 55 Although GASB accounting principles becoming effective in 2012 could be broadly read to permit a state to report state SPE financing obligations-even absent any legal obligation by the state with respect to financing-such reporting will not be mandated. This "off-balance-sheet" nature of state SPE debt can be misleading, however, if the state ultimately backstops the SPE debt. As discussed below, states often have strong economic and reputational motivations to backstop the debt of their SPEs, notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so. 54. Id. 55. Id. at 2-3 (using the example of a water district of a county, and assuming that the water district does not itself "provide resources to the county" other than indirectly by virtue of managing the county's water resources).
56. For example, GASB provides discretion to a primary government to include organizations that "do not meet the specific financial accountability criteria" as component units if doing so would "prevent the reporting entity's financial statements from being misleading." GASB, EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 8, ¶ 39. to-fail. In a federal context, for example, the government recently supported payment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's debt in order to promote stability and liquidity in the housing markets.
65
A state also may support payment of an SPE's debt in order to honor a moral obligation. This is especially likely to occur where the state SPE has issued moral-obligation debt. It also could occur, however, where the state has issued appropriationcontingent debt since there "remains a potential moral obligation" to fund the appropriation.
This not only constitutes a de facto guarantee but also suggests that state SPEs considered by their managers to be too important to fail might engage in morally hazardous behavior. 66 Additionally, a state may support payment of an SPE's debt merely to protect the state's reputation more generally. In a corporate context, for example, at the outset of the 2008 financial crisis many banks backstopped their affiliated structured investment vehicles (SIVs) solely to protect the banks' reputations. 67 In the case of Citigroup, this occurred notwithstanding that it reduced the capital ratio that regulators monitor to gauge that bank's ability to withstand losses on bad loans 68 and caused Moody's to lower the bank's long-term credit rating. 69 The reputational harm of not supporting payment of an SPE's debt may be even greater in a state than a corporate context because "investor perception of an implicit . . . government guarantee is hard to break," even by "statutory dis- 66 . See E-mail from W. Bartley Hildreth, supra note 61 (stating that even with appropriation-contingent debt there "remains a potential moral obligation," and observing that a moral-obligation argument was used "against the Governor's hesitancy to get involved with the bond rating analysts' questions" about whether the state would support a state SPE's debt For all of these reasons-to avoid jeopardizing its credit rating, to support government services performed by an SPE, to honor its moral obligations, and to generally protect its reputation-a state may well backstop the debt of its SPEs notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so. State financial statements that do not transparently disclose that debt and the state's de facto guarantee thereof would be misleading. As discussed, however, states rarely make that disclosure in their financial statements. 
Consequences of Lack of Transparency
The lack of transparency can undermine public finance and also make it even more likely that states will continue to manage their financial affairs with insufficient regard to their ability to repay debts. 73 That ability is not unlimited, even under a state's taxing power. At some point, an increase in the tax rate will cease to raise tax revenues because taxpayers will lose the incentive to earn income, engage in more tax planning to reduce their effective tax rate, or move to other states, causing economic output (and tax revenues) of the troubled state to decline further.
74
Lack of transparency can also create financial contagion due to investor difficulty in distinguishing among types of state debt. For example, as a result of the 1975 default by a New
The state ultimately may have to cut back on essential services; and creditors-even those whose debt claims are backed by the state's full faith and credit-may suffer losses if the state, unable to raise sufficient tax revenues to repay its obligations, is forced to restructure its debts. 71 . Id. (referencing statutory disclaimers and prospectus disclosures that Fannie Mae's debt is not backed by the U.S. government). In 1963, for example, the City of Chicago paid eighty percent of the back interest on bonds issued by the Calumet Skyway Authority due to a "feeling that a bond default by the Authority might damage the city's overall bond rating." MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 97 (citations omitted).
72. Additionally, lack of transparency can mislead not only investors but also citizens as to real costs. In a prominent example, a state SPE (the Washington Public Power Supply System, commonly known as WPPSS) issued revenue bonds in order to finance the construction of two power plants. 78 The revenue bonds were secured by contracts with local utility districts to purchase the resulting electricity. 79 Unknown to residents, 80 the utility districts agreed to support payment of the bonds even if the plants were never completed. 81 Due to cost overruns, the plants were not, in fact, completed, 82 leaving the utility districts-and thus residents of those districts-as the deep pockets for payment. 83 Finally, lack of transparency can impose an unforeseen burden on out-of-state taxpayers. This could occur, for example, if the federal government, as a result of increasingly negative 75. The UDC, tasked with building low cost housing throughout the state, was given authority to issue $2 billion worth of bonds backed by the moral obligation of the state. But, due largely to inept management, the authority was unable to repay its debt. DONALD AXELROD, SHADOW GOVERNMENT 74 (1992 The analysis above has shown that the use of state SPEs can reduce a state's financial transparency, with egregious consequences for the state, its residents, its creditors, and potentially the federal government (and thus taxpayers throughout the country). The Article next compares those consequences with the consequences of the lack of transparency caused by corporate SPEs.
A lack of transparency caused by corporate SPE debt can lead to companies unexpectedly failing and can also have systemic consequences to the financial system. 86 For these reasons, Congress and the SEC have devoted significant attention to an appropriate regulatory framework.
87
The lack of transparency caused by state SPE debt can similarly lead, as discussed, to unexpected state financial problems. 88 That lack of transparency might also have systemic consequences; by undermining governmental financial integrity, it could infect government securities markets. are larger than markets for state debt, 90 any comparison of consequences must be qualified by the possibility of correlations between those markets. A loss of confidence in, or a collapse of, government securities markets could trigger a broader lack of confidence or collapse of debt markets, possibly affecting the markets for corporate debt securities. A somewhat parallel event occurred in 2008 when a collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market triggered the broader collapse of virtually all markets for debt securities.
91 Similarly, the current European Union sovereign debt crisis is believed to have the potential to trigger broader systemic consequences. 92 Therefore, as with corporate SPE debt, attention should be given to creating an appropriate regulatory framework for problems of state SPE debt. Indeed, the need for such a regulatory framework may even be greater in the state than the corporate context. States may have a greater inherent propensity than corporations to want to use SPEs to raise off-balancesheet debt. Because states, unlike corporations, cannot "fail" in the sense of being forced to liquidate, they lack that deterrent against non-transparent use of SPEs. , at 11, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21529049 ("As credit lines gum up and outsiders plead for action, it is not just the euro that is at risk, but the future of the European Union and the health of the world economy. . . . A Greek default would threaten many banks, not just in Greece: this week the markets took aim at French banks that hold southern European debt."). Corporate counterparty risk, on the other hand, is more likely to have a systemic impact than governmental counterparty risk because corporate viability is more likely to be closely correlated than governmental viability since governments cannot be liquidated. Cf. supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between systemic risk and the correlation of financial viability).
93. Cf. Block, supra note 17, at 369-70 (observing that the risk of bankruptcy provides at least a "modest[] check on corporate accounting gimmicks," but lacking bankruptcy, "temptations for the government to engage in creative accounting may be even greater than those in the private sector"). Even though states cannot be liquidated, they still will have significant incentives to avoid default. It is unclear, though, whether those incentives are as strong as the incentive to avoid liquidation, and thus whether they are as likely to encourage sound financial choices.
by residents and creditors. 94 Corporations, in contrast, are monitored by shareholders and creditors. 95 Creditors monitor only to the limited extent of their negotiated covenants, and covenants in state debt are even more limited than covenants in corporate debt.
96
States are also monitored by residents, who have even less incentive to monitor than most creditors. Unlike creditors, few if any state residents are likely to have sufficient amounts at stake to justify the cost of monitoring.
Therefore creditor monitoring of state SPE debt is likely to be even more limited than creditor monitoring of corporate SPE debt. 97 The ability of state residents to freely choose to move to another state, notwithstanding some cost in doing so, may well further reduce their incentive to monitor. he public has significantly less voting power, enforcement rights and political power than private shareholder investors in private corporations . . . . In many ways, avoiding public participation is the reason public authorities are created.").
98. The WPPSS debacle also shows that residents may not even become aware of problems until too late. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (observing that residents of local utility districts were not informed that those districts had effectively guaranteed payment of WPPSS bonds). The residents only became aware of the problem after electricity costs rose to pay for the cost of those bonds. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 69 (discussing a "consumer revolt" after electricity rates increased greatly). This Article has already discussed how state SPEs are used to circumvent state constitutional debt limits. More broadly, however, state SPEs have been considered a means by which the corporate management structure (and its believed efficiency) could be applied to public-sector management, thereby avoiding political constraints and bureaucratic red tape.
1981, the
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State SPEs are thus not always subject to the types of controls applicable to managers of traditional state government agencies. 108 For example, competitive bidding procedures-which traditionally are used to diminish favoritism and political corruption in governmental contracting-are not necessarily applicable to state SPEs. 109 At least one commentator argues that, except for multi-jurisdictional state SPEs, the "benefits" accruing from this supposed corporate efficiency are largely illusory.
110
The Article next considers how regulation could help to mitigate state SPE abuses, focusing on the problem of state SPE debt. 114. "State-supported debt" is defined as any bonds or notes, including bonds or notes issued to fund reserve funds and costs of issuance, issued by the state or a state public corporation for which the state is constitutionally obligated to pay debt service or is contractually obligated to pay debt service subject to an appropriation, except where the state has a contingent contractual obligation. § 67-a. Furthermore, neither obligations due in less than one year nor those pursuant to annual legislative appropriations are considered "debt" subject to New York state's constitutional requirement for public referenda. These reforms have already started bearing fruit. For example, the New York State Comptroller has reported that, "[a]s a result of audit findings and recommendations, and administrative and legislative actions," a number of New York's state SPEs had announced actions to improve their accountability.
III. TOWARDS REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
119
The Comptroller also more recently observed that several state SPEs had restructured their bonds after seeking the Comptroller's approval, resulting "in total debt service savings of $456.9 million on a cash flow basis and $175.9 million on a net present value basis over the life of the bonds."
120 The Comptroller has also released reports on the operations of specific state SPEs. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act indirectly addressed improving accounting standards that govern when corporate SPEs should be consolidated with their parent companies. 126 The SEC Staff Report, however, more directly focused on the use of corporate SPEs to reduce financial transparency. 127 Observing that "many of the areas dealing with off-balance sheet arrangements involve significant use of accounting-motivated structured transactions" that utilize corporate SPEs, 128 the SEC staff advocated against "transactions and transaction structures primarily motivated by accounting and reporting concerns, rather than economics." 129 In that connection, the SEC staff urged the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, the corporate equivalent of the GASB) to consider changing corporate accounting principles in order to increase the transparency of corporate SPE debt and also admonished participants in the financial reporting process to become more aware of the problem. 130 To that end, FASB revoked its Financial Accounting Standard No. 140, which governed off-balance-sheet treatment of certain corporate SPE debt, and replaced it with a more nuanced (although also more ambiguous) test. issue securities to investors and use the proceeds to purchase financial assets, collections on which are used to repay the securities. 133 In that context, Dodd-Frank addressed, essentially, three issues: (1) improving disclosure to investors in the securities about the nature of the underlying financial assets; (2) limiting conflicts of interest between originators of those financial assets and investors in securities issued by corporate SPEs purchasing those assets; and (3) increasing rating agency scrutiny of securitization transactions. 134 The first two issues have little application per se to state SPEs, which have not been used (and there is no indication they are likely to be used) for securitization transactions.
C. A BROADER CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
Nonetheless, the broader goals of Dodd-Frank to improve investor disclosure, to limit conflicts of interest, and to increase rating agency scrutiny have some resonance for state SPEs.
These regulatory efforts to reform state and corporate SPEs suggest four overarching organizing principles: improving transparency of state SPE debt; improving monitoring of state SPEs; limiting state SPE debt; and improving state SPE governance. In deriving a broader conceptual framework, this Article first compares whether these principles would address all of the types of negative consequences identified in this Article.
136
(i) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt (i.e., that debt is often not shown as a liability on the balance sheets of their sponsoring states) can undermine state financial integrity, making it more likely, for example, that states will continue to manage their financial affairs with insufficient regard to their ability to repay their debts. This can lead to unexpected state financial problems, especially if the state ultimately backstops the SPE debt (and states often have strong economic and reputational motivations to de facto guarantee that debt, notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so).
Those consequences can be summarized as follows: (ii) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt might also have systemic consequences by causing a loss of confidence in state and possibly other government securities markets.
(iii) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt can mislead not only investors-including by creating contagion due to investor difficulty in distinguishing among types of state debt-but also state citizens as to real costs. Furthermore, a federal government bailout of that debt can impose an unforeseen burden on out-of-state taxpayers.
(iv) These consequences can be worse in public finance than in corporate finance because the use of SPEs in public finance is more susceptible to monitoring failures than their use in corporate finance.
(v) The non-representative corporate-style governance of state SPEs can undermine constitutional and democratic legitimacy. It can also generate conflicts that cause a state SPE to incur debt for its own benefit and not necessarily for the state's benefit. 137 Thus, the negative consequences identified in this Article result from the off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt, monitoring failures relating thereto, and state SPE governance failures.
These consequences correlate well to the overarching organizing principles suggested by regulatory efforts to reform state and corporate SPEs. Before doing so, however, it is worth asking why a state would consider enacting the Model Oversight Law or similar legislation, which would limit the state's ability to continue issuing non-transparent debt through SPEs. One answer is that the state would be increasing its financial transparency, as New York State has been trying to do.
proposed for enactment by individual states. I next examine how these principles, as articulated in the Model Oversight Law, could be applied. 139 New York has even found that improving the transparency of its SPE debt can, at least in certain cases, save money. 140 Another answer is that as the problem of state SPE debt becomes more publicly known, states that don't engage in reform will face reputational costs.
141 These costs might even include increased financing costs as investors become wary of the non-transparent financial condition of reform-averse states. And public and media outcry about the problem might put pressure on GASB to engage in its own effort to further reform government accounting principles for state SPE debt, which would remove the initiative from the states. 142 143. See supra note 85 (observing that "[m]any believe that the most heavily indebted states will require a bailout or a type of assisted bankruptcy from the federal government").
144. See Schwarcz, State Bankruptcy, supra note 74, at 336 (explaining why, so long as a "state has the right to decide whether or not to [enact a federally proposed legal framework], its sovereignty would not be impugned"). (footnote omitted)).
145. All references to specific sections in the remainder of the Article refer to the Model Oversight Law in Appendix I.
examines how the Model Oversight Law incorporates, and would apply to state SPEs, the principles of improving transparency, improving monitoring, limiting debt, and improving governance.
Improving Transparency of State SPE Debt
The Model Oversight Law seeks to improve transparency in two ways. The customary way of making debt transparent is by requiring balance-sheet disclosure under accounting rules. In the United States, accounting rules are promulgated bypursuant to private ordering in the form of delegation of authority by the Securities and Exchange Commission to-FASB in the case of corporate accounting 146 and GASB in the case of government accounting.
147
The Model Oversight Law first attempts to improve transparency by improving balance-sheet disclosure of state SPE debt. Section III.1(b) of that Law requires each state SPE to maintain audited financial statements, certified by independent public accountants as complying with GASB's generally accepted government accounting principles. It also requires each state SPE to deliver copies of these financial statements to the Authorities Oversight Office, an independent state government office created by the Model Oversight Law to oversee state SPEs. Subsection III.1(e) of that Law further requires each state SPE to establish a semi-independent audit committee to provide direct oversight of the accountants' audits.
The Model Oversight Law does not purport to question the government accounting principles promulgated by GASB. This Article suggests, however, that GASB should further examine how its accounting principles should treat balance-sheet disclosure of state SPE debt. One important question, already discussed in this Article, is how to determine when such debt should be disclosed in the first instance. FASB has been struggling with a similar question in the context of corporate accounting for SPE debt.
151
The Model Oversight Law's second approach to improving the transparency of state SPE debt is to consider mechanisms that go beyond accounting for such debt to be publicly disclosed. To this end, section II.1(e) of that Law requires the Authorities Oversight Office to assist state SPEs in improving the procedures by which their finances are publicly disclosed, including standardizing disclosure of their liabilities. Standardized disclosure would help to facilitate comparative analysis. Section II.1(i) also requires the Authorities Oversight Office to periodically issue reports on its findings and analyses and, except to the extent proprietary, to make these reports and analyses publicly available.
Improving Monitoring of State SPE Debt
Improved monitoring is a strong focus of the Model Oversight Law, which creates the Authorities Oversight Office to act as the primary monitor. Section III.1(c) of the Model Oversight Law requires each state SPE to inform the Authorities Oversight Office of its outstanding debt securities, the credit ratings on such debt, and any changes in those credit ratings. This enables the Authorities Oversight Office not only to monitor that debt but also to publicly promulgate information about the debt (thereby also increasing transparency).
Section II. Finally, section III.1(g) of the Model Oversight Law contemplates improved state SPE monitoring of its own debt. To this end, that Law requires each state SPE to establish a semiindependent finance committee to review and make recommendations on proposals by the SPE to issue debt.
Limiting State SPE Debt
To some extent, the finance committee requirement discussed above should help limit state SPE debt at appropriate levels. Section II.1(g) of the Model Oversight Law additionally requires the Authorities Oversight Office to make recommendations to the state's governor (and, as appropriate, the legislature) on setting state SPE debt limitations. To avoid the problem of these limits becoming obsolete over time, as has occurred at the state level with constitutional restrictions on bond debt, 152 The extent to which state SPE debt should be limited will depend on various factors, including the extent to which such debt-and the extent to which state backstopping of such debt-can be transparently disclosed. The less transparent the disclosure, the more such debt should be limited. This suggests a potential conflict of interest: a state that is intent on nontransparently backstopping its SPE debt might not want to follow recommendations of the Authorities Oversight Office. In section II.1(g) also requires the Authorities Oversight Office to update its recommendations over time. the event of such a conflict, the only recourse of the Authorities Oversight Office may be to go public with its recommendations-an event that would require significant political will.
Improving State SPE Governance
The Model Oversight Law adopts several approaches to improving state SPE governance. These approaches seek to strengthen the accountability of state SPEs to state government and, by extension, to the public, while also providing mechanisms for enforcement similar to those provided to corporate shareholders by Sarbanes-Oxley and to bondholders through corporate bond covenants.
On a general level, section III.2(a) of the Model Oversight Law requires each state SPE to inform the Authorities Oversight Office of its governance structure. Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section II.1 of that Law also require that Office to review and analyze the operations, practices, and reports of state SPEs, to assist state SPEs in improving their management practices, and to recommend to the state's governor (and, as appropriate, the legislature) how to improve state SPE performance. Subsections (c) and (d) of section III.2 require each state SPE to submit to the Authorities Oversight Office a multi-year financial plan as well as a mission statement setting forth the SPE's purposes and goals, a description of its stakeholders (and the SPE's understanding of their expectations), and a selfevaluation.
Section III.1(f) of the Model Oversight Law additionally requires each state SPE to self-examine its governance by establishing a semi-independent governance committee. This governance committee has the duty to review corporate governance trends, to keep the state SPE's management informed of current best governance practices, to review and recommend any necessary or appropriate updates to the SPE's governance, and to advise on the qualifications of the SPE's management.
The Model Oversight Law further attempts to limit conflicts of interest between state SPEs and their managers. To this end, section III.2(a) of that Law requires each state SPE to inform the Authorities Oversight Office of its conflict-ofinterest rules. Section III.1(f) of that Law also enables the governance committee to examine and advise on conflict-of-interest issues. Additionally, section III.2(b) requires each state SPE to report to the Authorities Oversight Office the compensation and other benefits of each member of management whose com-bined compensation and benefits exceeds a threshold level. High compensation levels may well signal the potential for conflict. 153 Finally, section II.2 of the Model Oversight Law imposes penalties on state SPEs and their managers that fail to comply with that Law's requirements. The Authorities Oversight Office has the power to publicly warn and censure state SPEs for noncompliance and to investigate complaints and issue any needed subpoenas. It also may request the state's governor (and, as appropriate, the legislature) to suspend or dismiss members of state SPE management for cause.
CONCLUSION
Like corporate special-purpose entities, or SPEs, which dominate the so-called "shadow banking" system, 154 states increasingly are using SPEs to create a vast shadow-financing network invisible to the public. 155 For example, because state SPE debt is not technically a legal obligation of the state, states do not have to disclose that debt in their financial statements.
The result is to reduce the transparency of public finance and to enable government officials to avoid public scrutiny. 156 The resulting lack of transparency undermines the ability of the public to monitor state fiscal obligations, thereby misleading investors and citizens as to the state's real costs and increasing the risk of systemic financial contagion. Ominously, the growing political pressure for debt reduction at the federal government level This lack of disclosure can nonetheless be misleading; states often have compelling economic and reputational motivations to, and almost always do, stand behind that debt.
ing even more of a financing burden onto states, in turn increasing their incentives to issue debt through SPEs.
The impact of this lack of transparency on public finance may well turn out to be worse than the impact of corporate SPE lack of transparency on corporate finance. Because states, unlike corporations, cannot fail in the sense of being forced to liquidate, they lack that deterrent against non-transparent use of SPEs. State public finance is also more susceptible than corporate finance to monitoring failures. Creditor monitoring of states and corporations is limited; shareholder monitoring helps fill that shortfall for corporations, but resident monitoring is unlikely to fill that shortfall for states. Moreover, being an integral part of government, state SPEs that lack transparency can undermine not only the integrity of public finance but also constitutional and democratic legitimacy.
A regulatory framework to govern the use of state SPEs is thus critically needed. This Article shows that any such framework should embrace at least four overarching organizing principles: improving transparency of state SPE debt, improving monitoring of state SPE debt, limiting state SPE debt, and improving state SPE governance. Using these principles, the Article proposes a Model Public Authorities Oversight Law and examines how it should apply to state SPEs and public finance, thereby enabling states to utilize the financing benefits of SPEs while controlling their hazards.
(Jan. 22, 2011), http://economyincrisis.org/content/how-reduce-national-debtwithout-raising-taxes-or-cutting-spending; Stabilize the Debt, THE COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET, http://crfb.org/stabilizethedebt/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). skills to understand the duties and functions of the governance committee; the governance committee shall keep the Authority's management informed of current best governance practices, shall review corporate governance trends, shall review and recommend any necessary or appropriate updates to the Authority's governance, shall advise on the skills and experiences required of members of the Authority's management, and shall examine and advise on ethics and conflict-of-interest issues; and (g) if and when the Authority issues debt or has debt outstanding, establish a finance committee, with at least [____] independent members [who shall constitute a majority of the finance committee, and] who shall possess the necessary skills to understand the duties and functions of the finance committee; the finance committee shall review and make recommendations on proposals for the issuance of debt by the Authority.
2. No later than [date] and annually thereafter, each Authority shall also have the duty to provide to the Authorities Oversight Office (a) a description of the Authority, its activities undertaken during the past year, its governance structure, its code of ethics, its conflict-of-interest rules, and (from time to time promptly after it occurs) any change to any of the foregoing; (b) a listing of the compensation and other benefits, direct and indirect, of each officer, director, other member of management, employee, and agent of the Authority making compensation and benefits aggregating in excess of $[________]; (c) a mission statement setting forth the purposes and goals of the Authority, a description of the Authority's stakeholders and the Authority's understanding of their expectations, a set of criteria by which performance of the Authority and achievement of its goals may be evaluated, and a selfevaluation based on those criteria; and (d) a [____]-year financial plan, including a current and projected capital budget and an operating budget report.
3. Notwithstanding sections III.1 and III.2 above, the Authorities Oversight Office may, upon application of any Authority, waive any requirement listed in those sections upon a showing that the Authority meets the criteria for such a waiver. Such criteria shall be established by regulations issued by the Authorities Oversight Office with the advice and consent of the Governor [and the Legislature], taking into account (among other factors) the relevance of the requirement to evaluation of
